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The White Elephant in the Room…
Annotation on European Commission Decision of 3 August 2016:
State aid SA.41342 (2016/N) – Germany. Financing of Berlin
Brandenburg Airport
Antigoni Lykotrafiti*
This annotation focuses on the latest (out of three) European Commission decisions on the
financing of the new Berlin airport by its public shareholders. The decision is important be-
cause it deals with a case having a great impact on the Single Market. Moreover, it consti-
tutes the first example of application of the private investor test in airport financing cases
after the publication of the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid – the jewel in the
crown of the State Aid Modernisation initiative. The commentary points to the link between
politics, law and economics in high-profile State aid cases, questioning the effectiveness of
EU State aid control.
Keywords: Market Economy Investor Principle; Airport Infrastructure; Airport Operator;
Traffic Forecast; Severability; Predictability.
I. Introduction
In May 2016, the European Commission adopted the
last part of its State Aid Modernisation initiative, its
Notice on the notion of State aid, where it had the
opportunity to elaborate on the market economy op-
erator test, as well as on the public funding of infra-
structure projects, including airport infrastructure.1
A few months later, in August 2016, the Commission
adopted its decision on the financing of the Berlin
Brandenburg Airport (BBA),2where it had (or, in fact,
missed) the opportunity to apply for the first time
the guidance provided in the Notice in conjunction
with the 2014 Aviation Guidelines.3 The Commission
decision is important not least because it deals with
one of the larger (if not the largest) infrastructure fi-
nancing operations in Europe, an airport whose con-
struction started in the year 2006, which was due to
open in October 2011 and is still in the making.4 Con-
sidering that the overall purpose of the State Aid
Modernisation initiative is to focus the Commission’s
resources on enforcing State aid rules in cases with
the biggest impact on the Single Market, the Berlin
Brandenburg Airport decision merits special atten-
tion.5
II. Background to the 2016 Commission
Decision
Originally, Berlin had three airports: Tegel and Tem-
pelhof in West Berlin and Schönefeld in East Berlin.
The reunification of Germany in 1990 triggered the
idea of a single airport for the Berlin-Brandenburg
area. The new centralised Berlin airport would do
away with the unbalanced capacity utilisation of the
three Berlin airports and serve the forecasted increas-
ing demand for air traffic. The planning procedure
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London.
DOI: 10.21552/estal/2017/2/17
1 European Commission, Notice on the notion of State aid as
referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, OJ 262/1, 19.07.2016.
2 European Commission, Decision State aid SA.41342 (2016/N) –
Germany. Financing of Berlin Brandenburg Airport, C (2016)
4948 final, 03.08.2016.
3 European Commission, Guidelines on State aid to airports and
airlines, OJ C 99/3, 04.04.2014.
4 See Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg (FBB) Press Release: “€2.4
billion for the airport – BBI funding set up”, 30.06.2009, available
at <http://www.berlin-airport.de/en/press/press-releases/2009/2009
-06-30-bbi-funding/index.php> Last accessed on16 May 2017.
5 European Commission, EU State Aid Modernisation (EU SAM),
COM(2012) 209 final, 08.05.2012 .
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was initiated in the 1990s and by 1999 Schönefeld
was chosen as the location for the new airport. Con-
struction works started in 2006 on a green field ad-
jacent to the existing Schönefeld airport, with the
opening of the new airport being envisaged for Oc-
tober 2011.
The European Commission was first involved in
the case in March 2009, when Germany notified it of
the measures that it had already taken to finance the
expansion of the new airport. The case was also the
subject of complaints from private individuals, alleg-
ing that the airport’s public shareholders intended to
grant illegal State aid to finance the airport’s con-
struction. Less than two months later, the Commis-
sion adopted a positive State aid decision,6 finding
the measures “not prejudicial to the common inter-
est as […] necessary and proportionate to reach objec-
tives of Community interest”, in line with the 2005
Aviation Guidelines.7 Specifically, the Commission
approved capital increases worth €654.5 million, a
100% guaranteed loan up to €2.4 billion and a €74
million infrastructure grant, all granted by the pub-
lic shareholders of the airport operator.
Despite the State aid, the opening of the new air-
port was postponed first to June 2012 and then to Oc-
tober 2013 due to planning and construction prob-
lems and heightened noise protection measures or-
dered by a national court for the airport’s neighbours.
The additional costs were estimated at €1.2 billion
and, as the airport operator was unable to finance
them through internal resources, in November 2012
the Commission was notified of the airport public
owners’ plan to increase their equity by the same
amount. Three weeks later, in December 2012, the
Commission cleared the operation as in line with the
market economy investor principle (MEIP),8 stating
that the “decision clarifies the application of EU state
aid rules to airports, in particular the application of
the MEIP test”.9
Even though, at the time of the 2012 decision, the
percentage of completion of the construction works
stood at 95%, the airport was not opened in 2013, as
planned.10 Instead, in January 2016, the Commission
was notified of the public shareholders’ plan to grant
to the airport operator a €1.1 billion loan and a share-
holder guarantee covering additional debt financing
of up to €1.1 billion to complete the works. Some six
months later, in August 2016, the Commission
cleared the public investment package as in compli-
ance with the MEIP.11 Since then, the opening of the
airport has been postponed first until 2017 and then
“for some time in 2018”.12
III. The 2016 Commission Decision
1. Description of the Measure
The new Berlin airport is developed and will be op-
erated by the holding company Flughafen Berlin
Brandenburg GmbH (FBB). FBB was founded in 1991
to operate Berlin’s three airports and is owned by the
Länder of Berlin and Brandenburg (holding 37% of
the shares each) and the Federal Republic of Germany
(holding 26% thereof). Tempelhof airport was closed
in 2008 and Tegel airport will follow suit once the
new Berlin airport is open. For now, FBB operates
both Tegel and Schönefeld.
The notified measure concerns investments con-
templated by FBB’s shareholders, amounting to
€2.207 billion in total, composed of €1.107 billion to
cover new costs for completing the airport and €1.1
billion to extend the capacity. The amount of €1.107
billion will be used to defray: (i) additional costs to
improve noise protection following the judgments
of the regional higher administrative court of April
2013 and May 2016, (ii) additional costs to improve
the fire protection system and, (iii) certain “immedi-
ate measures” (like the refurbishment of the north-
ern runway) and risk provisioning. The amount of
€1.1 billion will be used for capacity upgrades in view
of the ever-increasing demand for air traffic. The to-
6 Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. NN 25/2009 (ex N 167/2009) – Deutsch-
land Finanzierung des Flughafens Berlin Brandenburg Internation-
al. Commission decision available in the authentic German
language, at: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case
_details.cfm?proc_code=3_NN25_2009> Last accessed on 16
May 2017.
7 See European Commission, Press Release IP/09/757, 13.05.2009.
8 European Commission, decision of 19 December 2012 in State
Aid SA.35378 (2012/N) – Germany, Financing of Berlin Branden-
burg Airport, C (2012) 9469 final.
9 European Commission, Press Release IP/12/1410, 19.12.2012.
10 See 2012 Commission decision (n 8), [9].
11 Commission Decision (n 2) .
12 See Deutsche Welle of 21.01.2017, “ Berlin's delayed Branden-
burg Airport will not open in 2017”, available at: <http://www.dw
.com/en/berlins-delayed-brandenburg-airport-will-not-open-in
-2017/a-37224178> Last accessed on 16 May 2017; Deutsche
Welle of 06.03.2017, “Berlin's unfinished airport chief steps
down”, available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/berlins-unfinished
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tal financing of €2.207 billion is a combination of
two financing instruments which are granted as a
‘package’: (i) €1.107 billion hybrid financing through
a subordinate shareholder loan (quasi equity), and
(ii) a 100% guarantee underwritten by the sharehold-
ers.
2. Rationale for the Measure
The Commission recalled that the equity injection of
€1.2 billion which it authorised in its 2012 decision
as a market economy operation was due to unfore-
seeable events. These were a preliminary injunction
of the supreme administrative court of Berlin-Bran-
denburg requiring a level of noise protection exceed-
ing the applicable legal standards; unexpected plan-
ning and construction errors affecting the fire safe-
ty system; and extra costs and foregone revenue due
to the delayed opening of the airport. Some four years
later, little seems to have changed as to the unfore-
seeable nature of these events.
Specifically, with regard to noise protection, two
further judgments were issued by the same court in
2013 and 2016, increasing the applicable level of
noise protection. The German authorities conceded
that in 2012 a further tightening of noise protection
standards could not have been excluded.13 It is im-
portant in this regard that at the time of the Com-
mission’s decision (December 2012), the German
court had only issued a preliminary injunction (June
2012) initiated by a number of citizens a few months
earlier (April 2012). This suggests that the court’s
judgment was pending. However, they pointed out
that FBB had to rely on the legal and administrative
requirements existing at the time (as fleshed out in
a letter from the Ministry of Infrastructure and Agri-
cultureof theLandofBrandenburgaddressed toFBB,
dated 15 August 2012) in order to proceed with its
works.
The court rendered its judgment in April 2013,
heightening the applicable level of noise protection
beyond the executive explanations on noise protec-
tion measures that were provided in the aforemen-
tioned letter from the Ministry. In February 2014, a
further letter was addressed to FBB by the compe-
tent Ministry, informing it about the anti-noise ven-
tilation systems that had to be installed in eligible
households. The cost of these systems exceeded
FBB’s estimations. The need therefore arose for a
new noise protection programme, notified to the
Commission in January 2016. In May 2016, the Ger-
man court adopted yet another judgment on the
same issues, whose financial consequences had nev-
ertheless been contemplated by the notified pro-
gramme.
With regard to the planning and construction er-
rors affecting the fire safety system, the scope of the
technical inspection conducted in 2012, after the is-
sues with the fire protection system had been detect-
ed, proved to be too narrow and comprehensive in-
spections revealed further technical flaws. A new
survey and technical experiments were therefore
conducted, accounting for the necessary modifica-
tions and rectifying planning inconsistencies. The
notified measure reflects the actual costs to remedy
the fire protection issue. In 2012, the technical
mishaps that prevented the opening of the airport
had been considered unforeseeable in 2009, when
State aid was authorised, on the grounds that the
construction planning devised by the consortium
contracted by FBB had been approved by the Ger-
man authorities. By the same token, in 2016, the
shortcomings of the technical inspection were con-
sidered unforeseeable in 2012 on the grounds that
the scope of that inspection was determined first by
available technical documentation which only later
proved “absolutely inadequate” and secondly by the
degree of completion of the works, which at the time
stood at 95%.
With regard to extra costs and foregone revenue
due to the delayed opening of the airport, these per-
tained to capacity upgrades necessitated by the in-
crease in air traffic, the refurbishment of Runway
North and the extension of Taxiway Charlie. Based
on updated traffic forecasts, the airport would have
to cope with circa 32 million passengers per year up-
on opening in 2017, exceeding the initially planned
capacity of 24 million passengers. The under-esti-
mate of actual passenger numbers in 2012 was as-
cribed to the following unforeseeable factors: the as-
sumed economic downturn that did not occur; the
negligible effect on passenger traffic of the new air
traffic tax; the expansion of airline hub and long-haul
services; the increased feeder traffic; and the en-
durance of low-cost traffic. Even though the business
13 See 2016 Commission decision, 6 [19]; Commission Decision (n
2) .
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plan of 2012 had anticipated capacity extensions af-
ter the opening of the airport, these were expected
to be financed from the airport’s accrued cash flow.
The delay in the opening of the airport, in combina-
tion with the increase in air traffic, entailed addition-
al costs, notified to the Commission. By the same to-
ken, the 2012 decision had ascribed the longer con-
struction period and reduced revenues due to the de-
layed opening of the airport to the aforementioned
noise protection and fire safety issues and deemed
them unforeseeable.
3. Public Shareholders’ Decision-Making
Process
In February 2015, FBB’s shareholders approved a new
business plan, contingent on additional financing to
the amount of €2.6 billion. As FBB was unable to fund
interest and amortisation payment from its own re-
sources, the shareholders considered providing only
a guarantee so as to enable FBB to obtain the entire
funding from external sources, and they notified the
Commissionaccordingly.However, amonth later, the
shareholders decided to provide shareholder loans to
the amount of €1.107 billion and instructed FBB to
consider other options for the remaining €1.49 bil-
lion, making shareholder guarantees available if nec-
essary.
The terms of the intended guarantee were set af-
ter a tender procedure, in which FBB approached 19
banks about providing a loan of €2.5 billion. None of
them was willing to provide a loan without a 100%
guarantee. Eventually, FBB’s shareholders decided to
take out a loan to the amount of €2.5 billion in order
to refinance the existing consortium-loan of €1.4 bil-
lion, as well as to complete the funding needs iden-
tified in the business plan.
According to Germany, the whole funding pack-
age is aid-free. The quasi-equity character of the
shareholder subordinated loan is a means to provide
longer-term financial coverage for up to 20 years
while emphasising the temporary character of the fi-
nancing. The shareholder guarantee is a lesser bur-
den on the liquidity of public shareholders than the
outright provision of capital through equity or debt
and allows FBB to benefit from loan interest rates be-
ing at an all-time low. It should be mentioned that,
Figure 1: Berlin Brandenburg Airport- Budget
Source: Author's compilation, data extracted from <https://www.flughafen-berlin-kosten.de/>
Last accessed on 15 May 2017).
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in order to enhance project return, the shareholders
did not increase the guarantee fee charged under the
previous guarantee.
4. The Commission’s Legal Assessment
The Commission first examined whether the notified
measures could be severed from the State aid previ-
ously granted to FBB. Even though in its 2012 deci-
sion it found no State aid, it examined the severabil-
ity of the 2016 measures from the 2009 State aid mea-
sures in the light of its reasoning in the 2012 deci-
sion. Thus, it found that the notified measures can
be assessed separately from the 2009 measures giv-
en the lapse of time since 2009 and the fact that, be-
tween the 2009 aid measure and the notified mea-
sures a capital injection had been made which, pur-
suant to the 2012 decision, did not constitute State
aid as it was related to costs and risks arising from
unforeseeable events.
The Commission then moved on to apply the pri-
vate investor test on the shareholder guarantee to re-
finance the €1.4 billion loan authorised in 2009. It
found that the restructured loan was the economic
continuation of the previous loan; the guarantee cov-
ering it constituted State aid without which the pre-
vious loan could not have been obtained; the same
public bodies that underwrote the previous guaran-
tee would also underwrite the new one; and the guar-
antee fee remained unaltered. The Commission next
recalled the ING case, in which the Court found that,
when a Member State agrees to amend the terms un-
der which a measure of compatible aid has been
granted, that amendment may not constitute aid if a
market economy investor would also have agreed to
such an amendment in similar circumstances. The
Commission found, without further ado, that ING ap-
plies in the case at hand. Thus, the guarantee was
found to be a new measure amending an existing
compatible aid measure, which a rational private in-
vestor would take.
In applying the private investor test to the share-
holder guarantee for new debt and the quasi-equity
injection, the Commission considered that it would
first have to examine the predictability of the cost in-
creases, namely whether FBB, after the 2012 decision,
faced unpredictable circumstances and responded in
a manner similar to that of a market economy oper-
ator in similar circumstances. The Commission
found in the affirmative regarding all technical and
legal issues, aligning itself with the rationale of the
German authorities.
Specifically, regarding the fire protection system,
the Commission found that the technical flaws could
not have been anticipated given that the risk provi-
sions included in the 2012 business case seemed ad-
equate at the time; the business case passed the Com-
mission’s sensitivity check; and FBB took the neces-
sary measures to address the issues after they mani-
fested themselves. Regarding noise protection, the
Commission found that, although FBB and its share-
holders were aware that their interpretation of the
factual and legal situation could be challenged in the
future, they could not be expected to anticipate the
course of legal action and the judgments ultimately
Table 1: Berlin Brandenburg Airport - Timeline
Source: Author's compilation.
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rendered. Concerning capacity upgrades, the Com-
mission found that neither the growth of Berlin air
traffic beyond the forecasted levels nor the delay in
the opening of the airport due to the unforeseeable
technical problems could have been foreseen. Lastly,
regarding runway and taxiway refurbishments, the
Commission considered that these could not have
been foreseen in 2012 since the need to advance these
investments was a corollary to the delay in the air-
port opening and the unexpected traffic growth.
Having concluded that the necessity to grant the
notified measures was not foreseeable in 2012, the
Commission turned next to the compliance of the
shareholder guarantee for new debt with the MEIP
and in particular with the Guarantee Notice.14 The
Commission paid special attention to FBB’s rating
evaluation by Moody’s in February 2016. The latter
assigned it an issuer rating of A1 based on the expec-
tation that the shareholders would continue to step
in with financial support, the fact that more than
90% of its indebtedness would continue to be cov-
ered by guarantees from its shareholders, and FFB’s
very high indebtedness and weak financial profile re-
flected in a Baseline Credit Assessment of b3. In or-
der to determine whether a market-oriented price
was paid for the guarantee in the absence of close
comparators, that is to say similar guarantees provid-
ed by a private party to FBB, the Commission fol-
lowed the rate differential approach, in line with the
Guarantee Notice. To estimate the risk margins of the
loan with the State guarantee and without the guar-
antee, it considered, first, market data in the form of
credit default swap (CDS) spreads, second, the loan
margins published in its Reference Rate Communi-
cation and finally it performed direct benchmarking
with CDS rates. All results were below the minimum
guarantee premium charged by the public sharehold-
ers, rendering the transaction conform to the mar-
ket.
Lastly, the Commission applied the private in-
vestor test to the shareholder loan, which it qualified
as a quasi-equity instrument rather than a debt-fi-
nancing one on the basis of the 20-year duration of
the loan, the performance-related payment schedule,
the absence of collateralisation, the level of subordi-
nation, and the possibility of a subsequent conver-
sion into pure equity. Having regarded the loan as an
equity injection, it then examined its effect on the
equity value of FBB. The Commission structured its
analysis around three main scenarios that a hypothet-
ical private investor would consider, and examined
the equity value of the company under each scenario.
These were the following: a ‘base scenario’, whereby
the new airport would be put into operation with aug-
mented passenger capacity; a ‘completion as
planned’ scenario, whereby capacity upgrades would
be implemented only after opening; and a ‘discon-
tinuationof theproject’ scenario,whereby theproject
would be abandoned.
The Commission concluded that the equity value
in the base scenario – the one preferred by FBB’s
shareholders - was significantly higher than the eq-
uity values in the counterfactual scenarios. To con-
firm that the base scenario was indeed the preferred
one in terms of profitability, the Commission subject-
ed it to sensitivity analyses, whereby it established
that, even under the most pessimistic assumption,
the equity value in the base scenario was still posi-
tive. On the basis of these results, the Commission




Commenting on the Berlin Brandenburg Airport
Commission decision is no easy task if one is a jurist.
This is because there is little law in this decision. It
suffices to mention that the only legal basis on which
the Commission relied to carry out its analysis (apart
from Article 107 TFEU and the Procedural Regula-
tion15) is the Guarantee Notice.16 The 2016 Notice on
the Notion of Aid was only invoked once and this in
passing, with no analysis conducted thereunder.17
The 2014 Aviation Guidelines slipped the Commis-
sion’s attention altogether.18 The same applies to the
case law of the European Union Courts with the in-
vocation only of the BP-Chemicals judgment (stan-
14 European Commission, Notice on the application of Articles 87
and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees, OJ
C 155/10, 20.06.2008.
15 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down
detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TEFU, OJ L 248/9,
24.09.2015.
16 2008 Commission Notice (n 15).
17 2016 Commission Notice (n 1).
18 2014 Aviation Guidelines (n 3).
EStAL 2 |2017 305EC Decision - Financing of Berlin Brandenburg Airport
dard as it may be in the context of severability)19 and
the ING judgment, a case with a completely different
set of facts, time frame and overall philosophy.20 The
Commission seems to consider that the mere invoca-
tion of the ING judgment in particular is a sufficient
substitute for its reasoning in the context of the is-
sue discussed.
Another striking feature of the decision is that, ar-
guably, it consists of two disjointed parts: Part 2 pro-
vides an accurate and objective description of the
measure, which, however, raises a plethora of ques-
tions and counter-arguments that the reader expects
to see addressed in due course; Part 3 is concerned
with the assessment of the measure and it is at this
very place that the Commission’s analysis is de-
ployed and where one expects to find the answers to
the questions and counter-arguments raised earlier.
However, when reading the decision one gets the
feeling that the two parts are separate and no effort
has been made to align them. This suggests that the
Commission endorses the statements made in Part
2.
2. Specific Remarks
The aforementioned general remark about the weak-
ness of the Commission’s legal analysis can be seen,
in the first instance, in its analysis of the concept of
severability. In the section of the decision discussing
the severability of the notified measures from the
State aid measures approved in 2009, the Commis-
sion finds that the new notified measures can be as-
sessed separately from the 2009 State aid decision.21
To support this finding, it relies on its reasoning in
the 2012 decision even for the refinancing of the €1.4
billion guaranteed loan authorised in 2009, a mea-
sure that did not exist at the time of the 2012 deci-
sion. Having broken the link with the 2009 decision,
not by the application of the BP-Chemicals judgment
(as it should have done),22 but by applying its own
reasoning in the 2012 decision, in the next section,
discussing the application of the MEIP to the €1.4
billion guaranteed loan authorised in 2009,23 it re-es-
tablishes that link via the ING case.24 Thus, whilst
on the one hand it considers that the new sharehold-
er guarantee to refinance the 2009 loan can be sev-
ered from the 2009 guaranteed loan, on the other
hand, it finds that the new measure amends the
terms of the old measure and achieves more benefi-
cial terms.
It is worth mentioning, in this regard, that the
shareholder guarantee to refinance the 2009 loan is
a new measure (to be distinguished from the concept
of “new aid” under the Procedural Regulation),25
whose object is “an existing aid” within the meaning
of the Procedural Regulation.26 This distinction
seems to have been blurred by the Commission’s
wording. Thus, whilst in paragraph 45 it states that
“the notified new measures can be assessed separate-
ly from the State aid measures that were approved
by the 2009 decision”, in paragraph 47, it states that
“the restructured loan by nature is the economic con-
tinuation of the previous loan”. Subsequently, in
paragraph 49, by application of the ING case, it finds
that “the guarantee provided by shareholders to cov-
er the refinancing of the EUR 1.4. bn loan is a new
measure amending an existing compatible aid mea-
sure” and that “it is rational for FBB’s shareholders
to grant a ‘new’ (sic.) 100% guarantee to cover the
‘new’ (sic.) EUR 1.4 bn loan resulting from the refi-
nancing operation”. Arguably, this wording and
punctuation creates confusion, as it suggests that the
guarantee for refinancing is both a new measure,
which can be severed from the 2009 measure, and a
newmeasure,whichcannotbesevered fromthe2009
measure, but can be justified by application of the
MEIP.
The Commission’s anxiety to break the link with
the 2009 State aid decision, but maintain it with the
2012 non-aid decision is manifest also in its MEIP
analysis of the shareholder guarantee for new debt
and the quasi-equity injection. Throughout the deci-
sion, the Commission relies on the false premise that
the occurrence of unforeseeable events suffices for
the private investor test to be passed. This presump-
tion stems from its 2012 decision, where the costs
and risks under consideration were deemed unfore-
seeable, justifying the shareholders’ capital injec-
19 Case T-11/95 BP Chemicals Limited v Commission [1998] ECR
II-3235.
20 Joined Cases T-29/10 and T-33/10 Netherlands and ING v Com-
mission, judgment of 2 March 2012, ECLI-98.
21 See section 3.1.
22 BP Chemicals (n 20).
23 Section 3.2.
24 ING (n 21).
25 See Article 1(c) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (n 16).
26 See Article 1(b) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (n 16).
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tions. By the same token, in its 2016 decision the Com-
mission makes the application of the private investor
test contingent on the issue of predictability of cost
increases. It thus introduces a separate section on the
issue of predictability - prior to applying the private
investor test - to establish whether the cost increas-
es were foreseeable or not, the suggestion being that,
in the affirmative the MEIP is not met, whereas in
the negative it is.27
The Commission’s take on the issue of predictabil-
ity is bizarre. It effectively suggests that private in-
vestors are shielded from unforeseeable events. This
is a dangerous presumption since it opens the door
to the provision of blanket risk capital. Looking at
the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid,
the issue of predictability is discussed in the context
of severability.28 Indeed, the private investor test is
a rationality test rather than a predictability one. It
is difficult to see how what was deemed unforesee-
able at the time of the 2012 decision remained un-
foreseeable until the time of the 2016 decision. There
is not a single issue tackled in the 2016 decision which
was not manifest at the time of the 2012 decision.
Whether the risks assumed in 2012 manifested them-
selves in 2016, affecting the profitability of the ben-
eficiary, is equally irrelevant in the context of the pri-
vate investor test, since the latter is also not a prof-
itability test.29
Even though the Commission severed the 2016
measures from the 2009 State aid measures, it is in-
teresting to compare the way it applied the private
investor test to the shareholder guarantees autho-
rised in 2009 and in 2016. In both cases, the law ap-
plicable is the Guarantee Notice.30
Looking first at the 2009 Commission decision,
the Commission paid special attention to the cumu-
lative conditions that have to be fulfilled under the
Guarantee Notice to rule out the presence of aid and,
in particular, the condition that the guarantee does
not cover more than 80% of the outstanding loan or
other financial obligation and the condition that a
market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.31The
Commission established the presence of an advan-
tage since the State guarantee covered 100% of the
outstanding loan and the market price of the guaran-
tee was not paid.32 Subsequently, to authorise the
guarantee as compatible State aid, it examined the
specific nature of the transaction, in line with the
Guarantee Notice, which provides that “in order to
ensure that the lender has a real incentive to proper-
ly assess, secure and minimise the risk arising from
the lending operation, and in particular to assess
properly the borrower’s creditworthiness, a percent-
age of at least 20% not covered by a State guarantee
should be carried by the lender. Any derogation has
to be duly justified by the Member State, for instance
on the basis of the specific nature of the transac-
tion”.33 The factors that mattered to the Commis-
sion’s assessment were the large magnitude of the in-
frastructure project, the long amortisation period
leading Germany to envisage 2036 in its return val-
uation and the 25-year duration of the loan. On this
basis, the Commission authorised the guarantee as
compatible State aid.34
Looking at the 2016 Commission decision, even
though the shareholder guarantee for new debt cov-
ered 100% of the underlying loan, the Commission
completely disregarded the 80% threshold set by the
Guarantee Notice. Thus, it did not explain why a dero-
gation was justified in this case. Instead, it stated that
“the Guarantee Notice is based on the principle that
the borrower obtains an advantage through State re-
sources if it does not need to pay an appropriate pre-
mium to cover the risk associated with a guarantee
that is provided by the State” and conducted its analy-
sis in the light of the condition of a market-oriented
price exclusively.35 This discrepancy suggests that
the guarantee granted in the year 2009 (some two
and a half years before the envisaged opening of the
airport and with no technical and construction faults
discovered) was riskier than the guarantee granted
in the year 2016 (some five years after the envisaged
opening of the airport and amidst a maelstrom of
problems), hence the qualification of the former as
a State aid and the latter as a normal market opera-
tion. This finding, however, does not sit well with the
fact that in 2009 FBS was able to borrow from the
banks the total amount of the loan needed (€ 2.4 bil-
lion) without State guarantee, whereas in 2016 it was
27 See section 3.3.1.
28 See 2016 Commission Notice (n 1), [81].
29 See 2016 Commission Notice (n 1), [76].
30 2008 Commission Notice (n 15).
31 See section 3.2. (c) and (d).
32 See 2009 decision (n 6), [55].
33 See section 4.1. (c).
34 See 2009 decision (n 6), section 4.1.3.
35 See 2016 decision (n 2), section 3.3.2.
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unable to borrow more or less the same amount (€
2.5 billion) without a 100% State guarantee.36
Examining more closely the treatment that the
Commission afforded to the condition that a market-
oriented price is paid for the guarantee in its 2009
decision and its 2016 decision, a number of differ-
ences can be discerned, the most notable being the
length of the analysis. In the 2009 decision, the aid
element of the guarantee was established in three
brief paragraphs.37 By contrast, in the 2016 decision,
the aid-free character of the guarantee was estab-
lished in three pages.38 On the face of it, this is intel-
ligible since, in 2009, the Commission was aware of
the interest rate that the market would charge with-
out the guarantee and all it had to do was to compare
it with the interest rate that the market would charge
with the guarantee to establish the difference (tak-
ing into account also the premium paid for the guar-
antee).39 By contrast, in the 2016 decision, there was
no close comparator for the market interest rate to
consider, since no bank was willing to provide the
loan without a 100% guarantee. As a result, the Com-
mission had to conduct a thorough analysis in line
with the Guarantee Notice.40
However thorough the Commission’s analysis
may be regarding the methodology followed, it is
cryptic regarding the rates, risk margins and premi-
ums considered, all relevant figures having been
redacted as confidential. By and large, this is not an
innovation of the 2016 decision, but a trait of all Com-
mission decisions on BBA (2009, 2012 and 2016).
Therefore, it is impossible to assess the validity of
these figures. This notwithstanding, it may be worth
focusing on the Commission’s take on FBB’s rating
evaluation.41 In the 2009 decision, the Commission
stated that FBS was not rated, but, according to the
German authorities, its credit worthiness was simi-
lar to a “BBB” rating.42 In the 2012 decision, the rat-
ing of FBB was not disclosed, the Commission stat-
ing: “[T]he rating of FBB is between […] and […]. The
chosen rating of FBB (i.e. […]) is […] than the rating
of BBB, which was acknowledged in the 2009 Com-
mission decision”.43 Six months before the 2016 de-
cision, the rating agency Moody’s assigned an issuer
rating of A1 to FBB, reflecting: (i) the expectation that
the shareholders will continue to step in with time-
ly financial support, (ii) that more than 90% of its in-
debtedness will continue to be covered by guarantees
from its shareholders, and (iii) FBB’s very high in-
debtedness and weak financial profile on a stand-
alone basis reflected in a Baseline Credit Assessment
of b3.44 In its analysis, the Commission took into ac-
count the rating of A1.45 Even though it acknowl-
edged that this rating is a “free ride”, so to speak, 46
it assured itself that the envisaged fee would remain
market conform even if a BBB+ rating had been con-
sidered.47
If the Commission is right in its assessment and
FBB’s rating has improved (or stayed the same) since
2009, this should be reflected in the profitability of
the company. Comparing the application of the MEIP
to the capital injection of € 1.2 billion and the quali-
fied as quasi-equity injection of €1.1 billion autho-
rised as market conform in the 2012 decision and the
2016 decision respectively, a number of differences
emerge.Arguably, themost strikingdifference is that,
whilst in the2012decision, theCommissiondisclosed
a range of figures pertaining to the equity value of
36 See 2009 decision (n 6), [60], providing that “without guarantee
and on the basis of the proposal of different banks before the
beginning of the financial crisis, FBS would have been able to
borrow from banks at EURIBOR plus a risk premium of […]
basis points for the same loan amount and collaterals (duration
25 years), which can therefore be considered as the specific
market interest rate without guarantee” (translation in English
provided by the European Commission following a request (in
accordance with Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission docu-
ments) for an English language version of the authentic version of
the Decision in the German language). See 2016 decision (n 2),
[29], providing that “the terms of the intended guarantee were set
after a tender procedure, in which FBB approached 19 banks
about providing a loan of EUR 2.5 billion under various possible
alternative scenarios: no shareholder guarantee, an 80%, and a
100% guarantee. According to Germany, no creditor was willing
to provide a loan without a 100% guarantee”.
37 See 2009 decision (n 6), [59-61],
38 See 2016 decision (n 2), [64-81].
39 See Guarantee Notice (n 15), section 4.2.
40 See Guarantee Notice (n 15), section 3.2. (d).
41 Ibid.
42 See footnote 27 of 2009 decision (n 6),
43 See footnote 12 of 2012 decision (n 8).
44 See paragraph 69 and footnote 32 of 2016 decision (n 2).
45 See 2016 decision (n 2), [77].
46 See 2016 decision (n 2), [70] providing: “As pointed out in the
Moody’s press release if the rating of any one shareholder deterio-
rates or the level of support provided by them through guarantees
and expected cash injections changes, this will have a downward
effect on the rating of FBB”.
47 See footnote 27 of 2016 decision (n 2) providing that “even
considering a notching down of about three notches to take
into account the expected future public support for FBB included
in the A1 rating, the envisaged fee is market conform”.
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the company in the context of the various scenarios
considered, in the 2016 decision, there was no such
disclosure, all figures having been redacted. This is
all the more peculiar considering the wideness of the
range of figures disclosed in 2012, being € 2-7 billion
in the basic scenario,48 € 0.5-2 billion in the counter-
factual scenario,49 € 4-10 billion in the best case sce-
nario of the sensitivity analysis50 and € 1.2-5 billion
in the worst case scenario of the sensitivity analysis.51
In addition, when comparing the various scenar-
ios in the light of the MEIP, the Commission seems
to have applied a different logic in its decisions. In
the 2012 decision, it stated that the public sharehold-
ers act in line with the MEIP only if they select the
option which maximises their shareholder (equity)
value. Consequently, it compared whether the equi-
ty value in the basic scenario was larger than the in-
jected amount and larger than the equity value un-
der the counterfactual scenario.52Having established
that that was the case, it declared the capital injec-
tion market conform.53 By contrast, in the 2016 deci-
sion, although it established that even under the most
pessimistic assumption, the equity value in the basic
scenario would still be positive, it refrained from pro-
nouncing on whether the quasi-equity injection was
larger than the company’s equity value.54 Instead, it
stated that “that comparison is to be seen in the light
of the evolution of the underlying very large and com-
plex project [...] characterised by a combination of
technical and management issues that resulted in de-
lays and cost overruns which in turn required share-
holder intervention to remedy these issues”.55
This differentiation can be seen also in the estima-
tion of the cost of equity, and specifically in the ‘be-
ta coefficient’ indicating the market risk a company
is facing. In both decisions, the Commission deviat-
ed from its practice, whereby “in principle, the esti-
mate of the beta coefficient is to be based on a for-
ward looking basis”.56 Instead, it accepted FBB’s his-
torical beta coefficients, yet not on exactly the same
grounds. Specifically, whilst in the 2012 decision it
found that even when considering historical beta co-
efficients, “the equity value would be larger than the
injected amount and larger than the equity value un-
der the counterfactual scenario”,57 in the 2016 deci-
sion, it found that “the equity value of the company
would still be higher than the equity value under the
counterfactual scenarios”.58 This differentiation
points to the fact that the quasi-equity injection of
€1.1 billion cleared in 2016 was higher than FBB’s eq-
uity value. Therefore, FBB’s profitability must have
declined since the time of the 2012 decision, when
its equity value was estimated at € 2-7 billion.
One could question further the assumptions un-
derlying the cost of equity. For example, even though
in both business plans on which FBB’s shareholders
based their decisions (i.e. the 2012 business plan and
the 2015 business plan),59 the beta coefficient was
based on historical beta coefficients, the German au-
thorities ascribed the difference between the cost of
equity in 2012 and the cost of equity in 2015 “to the
capital market situation as of 1 January 2015, as well
as a modified beta-coefficient, base rate and applica-
ble tax rate”.60 Looking at the decision-making
process leading to the financing measures, according
to the German authorities, “the shareholders in
essence planned that package to benefit from the cur-
rent favourable climate on capital markets and to
reacha long-termfinancingmix”.61This seems to sug-
gest that FBB’s cost of equity has decreased since
2012. If this is the case, then FBB’s profitability must
have increased along with its equity value, which in
turn raises the question why did not the Commission
affirm in its 2016 decision that the quasi-equity in-
jection was considerably lower than FBB’s equity val-
ue.
Questioning further the assumptions endorsed by
the Commission would probably amount to hair-
splitting in the absence of concrete data to take into
account. What is more, it could best and more safe-
ly be done by economic experts. From a legal perspec-
tive, even though the Commission has not invoked
the 2014 Aviation Guidelines in its 2016 decision, it
has stayed loyal to the requirement for economic
48 See 2016 decision (n 2), [52, 59].
49 See 2016 decision (n 2), [56].
50 See 2016 decision (n 2), [62].
51 See 2016 decision (n 2), [63].
52 See 2016 decision (n 2), [66].
53 See2016 decision (n 2), [69-70].
54 See 2016 decision (n 2), [120].
55 See 2016 decision (n 2), [121].
56 See 2012 decision (n 8), [48] and 2016 decision (n 2), [100], both
citing the Ciudad da la Luz studios.
57 2012 decision (n 8), [48].
58 See 2016 decision (n 2), [101].
59 See 2012 decision (n 8), [39] and 2016 decision (n 2), [91].
60 See 2016 decision (n 2), [99].
61 See 2016 decision (n 2), [32].
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analysis when applying the private investor test.62
However, the Commission’s economic analysis does
not seem to provide legal certainty regarding the ap-
plication of the Guidelines and in particular the re-
quirements for “sound ex ante profitability
prospects”, “realistic traffic forecasts” and “reason-
able sensitivity analysis”.63 What is “sound”, “realis-
tic” and “reasonable” is a matter of legal assessment
that the European Union Courts should perhaps re-
instate.
V. Conclusion
Since its inception in the 1984 Commission Commu-
nication on Government Capital Injections, the MEIP
has evolved from a weak and relaxed mechanism of
State aid compliance into a tool of rigorous legal and
economic analysis.64 It suffices to compare the appli-
cation of the principle in the first airline restructur-
ing cases of the late 1980s-early 1990s with its appli-
cation in the most recent airport infrastructure cas-
es. The State Aid Modernisation initiative culminat-
ed in the 2016 Commission Notice on the notion of
State aid, an instrument that crystallises decades of
experience in EU State aid control and illustrates in
the clearest manner the efforts of the European Com-
mission to shield itself from political pressure, en-
demic in State aid cases, and promote European in-
tegration.
The2016BerlinBrandenburgAirportdecisionpre-
sented the Commission with a unique opportunity
to apply its rules on the MEIP, as summarised in its
recent Notice, to a high-profile case that has attract-
ed wide media coverage. Arguably, the Commission
did not live up to the expectations that it created with
its State Aid Modernisation programme. It is regret-
table that, in the decision in question, transparency
has been mixed up with professional secrecy, consis-
tency with severability, predictability with risk capi-
tal, safe harbours with traffic forecasts, in short, a
market economy operation with a State aid. Since ju-
dicial control is no longer possible, it is at least hoped
that the decision will not be used by the Commission
as a point of reference for its future decisional prac-
tice.
62 See Aviation Guidelines (n 3), [51].
63 Ibid.
64 See Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty to public
authorities’ holdings, Bulletin EC 9-1984, point 3.2.
